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 II.-102 
ARE SANCTUARY CITIES SAFE? 
EVALUATING THE DOJ’S AUTHORITY TO 
IMPOSE IMMIGRATION CONDITIONS ON 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE GRANTS 
Abstract: On March 24, 2020, in City of Providence v. Barr, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit held that the Department of Justice lacked statutory 
authority to impose immigration-related conditions on Edward Byrne Memorial 
Justice Assistance Grants awarded to Providence and Central Falls, Rhode Island. 
As the most recent of five circuit courts to consider this issue, the First Circuit 
squarely rejected the Second Circuit’s holding that the challenged conditions 
were statutorily authorized. Instead, the First Circuit sided with the Seventh, 
Third, and Ninth Circuits in striking down the challenged conditions. Although 
the First Circuit reached the same ultimate conclusion as the Ninth Circuit, it 
used an alternate reasoning. This Comment argues that the First Circuit in Provi-
dence v. Barr correctly interpreted the text and structure of the statutes at issue 
and respected congressional intent, thus serving as a useful model for future 
courts confronted with this question. 
INTRODUCTION 
The development of sanctuary policies, or state and local practices aimed at 
limiting coordination with federal immigration authorities, reflects decades of 
tension between local and federal government over the role of law enforcement 
in effectuating immigration laws.1 In recent years, President Donald Trump’s 
“tough on immigration” stance elicited vigorous reactions from states and mu-
nicipalities that disagreed with his approach.2 These disagreements have led to 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703, 1707 
(2018) (arguing that, although sanctuary city debates were particularly prevalent during President 
Trump’s administration, they should be understood within the movement’s decades-long history); see 
also Rose Cuison Villazor, “Sanctuary Cities” and Local Citizenship, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573, 
576 (2010) (articulating tensions between local and national concepts of “citizenship” and arguing that 
sanctuary jurisdictions have helped create a sense of membership for undocumented immigrants in 
their communities); Bridget Stubblefield, Development in the Executive Branch, Sanctuary Cities: 
Balancing Between National Security Directives, Local Law Enforcement Autonomy, and Immigrants’ 
Rights, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 541, 542–43 (2015) (discussing legislation and executive programs that 
required local authorities to assist with federal immigration enforcement). 
 2 See Claire Felter, Danielle Renwick & Amelia Cheatham, The U.S. Immigration Debate, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (June 23, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-immigration-
debate-0 [https://perma.cc/H3SD-8G36] (noting that over 700 jurisdictions have policies that curb 
their involvement with immigration enforcement and highlighting legal battles in recent years between 
the Department of Justice and sanctuary jurisdictions over these policies). A sampling of President 
Trump’s immigration actions include: issuance of executive orders broadening priority deportation 
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numerous lawsuits, forcing the judiciary to grapple with challenging questions of 
federalism and separation of powers.3 
In March 2020, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in City of Providence v. 
Barr, became the most recent circuit court to consider whether the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) had statutory authority to condition the receipt of federal funds 
from the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program on grantees’ 
compliance with immigration-related requirements.4 Considering four statutory 
provisions as proffered sources of authority, three of which govern the grant pro-
gram and one that outlines the Assistant Attorney General’s duties, the court held 
that the DOJ lacked statutory authority to impose the conditions.5 In doing so, 
the First Circuit split from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that 
the DOJ was statutorily authorized to condition the grants, and joined the Sev-
enth, Third, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals in striking down the challenged 
conditions.6 
                                                                                                                           
categories; construction of a border wall; prohibition of individuals from certain Muslim-majority 
countries from entering the United States; a drastic reduction in the number of annually admitted refu-
gees; an attempt to eliminate the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program; implementation of 
a “zero-tolerance policy” that resulted in family separations; creation of the Migrant Protection Proto-
cols, under which asylum seekers arriving at the southern border must remain in Mexico while they 
pursue their asylum claims; and denial of asylum eligibility to individuals who fail to first seek asy-
lum in a “safe third country” before applying in the United States. Id. He also targeted sanctuary juris-
dictions through Executive Order 13,768. SARAH HERMAN PECK, U.S. CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44795, 
“SANCTUARY” JURISDICTIONS: FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL POLICIES AND RELATED LITIGATION 
16 (2019). See generally Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017). The order threat-
ened the retention of federal funds from jurisdictions that did not enforce a federal statute aimed at 
ensuring local cooperation with federal immigration authorities. PECK, supra at 17; see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1373 (preventing federal, state, or local governments from restricting communication with federal 
immigration authorities regarding individuals’ immigration status). 
 3 See PECK, supra note 2, at 19–37 (summarizing ten key lawsuits that cities and states brought to 
challenge Executive Order 13,768, as well as lawsuits the DOJ brought to challenge California’s laws 
limiting the involvement of local actors in federal immigration enforcement); see also infra notes 41–
43 and accompanying text (discussing the arguments that Rhode Island cities raised to challenge im-
migration-related conditions on their federal grant awards, including violations of separation of pow-
ers principles, the Tenth Amendment, and the Spending Clause). 
 4 City of Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir. 2020). 
 5 Id. at 32, 36, 39, 45; see 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(4) (the data reporting provision of the Byrne JAG 
Statute); id. § 10153(a)(5)(C) (the coordination provision of the Byrne JAG Statute); id. § 10153(a)(5)(D) 
(the applicable laws provision of the Byrne JAG Statute); id. § 10102 (the Duties and Functions of the 
Assistant Attorney General Statute). 
 6 Compare Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 45 (holding that the DOJ was not authorized to im-
pose the challenged conditions), City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931, 944–45 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(same), City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 2019) (same) reh’g denied 
(June 24, 2019), and City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 293 (7th Cir. 2018) (same), reh’g en 
banc granted in part on other grounds, vacated in part on other grounds, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 
4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018), reh’g en banc vacated, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. 
Aug. 10, 2018), with New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 951 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that 
the statutes analyzed did provide such authority). 
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Part I of this Comment provides an overview of sanctuary cities, the grant 
program at issue, and the facts of Providence v. Barr.7 Part II discusses the cir-
cuit split and the various methods of statutory interpretation that the Seventh, 
Third, Ninth, Second, and First Circuits utilized.8 Finally, Part III argues that the 
First Circuit in Providence v. Barr rightly rejected the Second Circuit’s approach 
and varied its rationale from that of the Ninth Circuit, providing a helpful model 
for future courts confronted with this issue.9 
I. THE LEGAL, HISTORICAL, AND FACTUAL CONTEXT OF THE FIRST 
CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN CITY OF PROVIDENCE V. BARR 
The circuit split over the DOJ’s authority to condition grants to state and 
local governments through the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant 
Program developed in a political environment already highly polarized over im-
migration issues.10 Section A of this Part provides a brief historical background 
of sanctuary jurisdictions.11 Section B discusses the grant program at issue.12 
Finally, Section C outlines the factual and procedural history of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit’s 2020 decision in City of Providence v. Barr.13 
A. Sanctuary Jurisdictions Arise in Opposition to  
Federal Immigration Policies 
The modern sanctuary jurisdiction traces its roots to the Sanctuary Move-
ment of the 1980s.14 As large numbers of asylum seekers fled civil wars in Cen-
                                                                                                                           
 7 See infra notes 10–50 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 51–112 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 113–133 and accompanying text. 
 10 See PECK, supra note 2, at 16–17 (describing tensions between sanctuary jurisdictions and 
federal immigration policies). Opinions on immigration remain highly divided across party lines. See 
Engy Abdelkader, Immigration in the Era of Trump: Jarring Social, Political, and Legal Realities, 44 
HARBINGER 76, 76 (2020) (citing data from the Public Religion Research Institute). For example, 
2019 data demonstrated that 60% of Republicans “perceive[d] immigrants as increasing crime in local 
communities,” compared to only 22% of Democrats. Id. 
 11 See infra notes 14–23 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 24–32 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 33–50 and accompanying text. 
 14 See Annie Lai & Christopher N. Lasch, Crimmigration Resistance and the Case of Sanctuary 
City Defunding, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 539, 544–45 (2017) (noting that current sanctuary jurisdic-
tion debates are not new and instead reflect four decades of disagreement over sub-federal authorities’ 
roles in implementing federal immigration laws); Toni M. Massaro & Shefali Milczarek-Desai, Con-
stitutional Cities: Sanctuary Jurisdictions, Local Voice, and Individual Liberty, 50 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2018) (explaining how the modern sanctuary jurisdiction developed from the 
Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigra-
tion Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 600 (2008) (noting the historic development of this move-
ment). Sanctuary jurisdictions are generally understood as jurisdictions that aim to protect immigrants 
through laws and practices limiting their involvement in federal immigration enforcement. Massaro & 
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tral America, churches and other organizations, believing the U.S. government 
was wrongfully denying asylum, began offering protection of their own ac-
cord.15 Over time, this grassroots movement developed into formal policies at 
the local level, helping incorporate undocumented immigrants into communi-
ties.16 At the same time, a shifting narrative at the federal level characterizing 
immigration as “a public safety issue” led to greater overlap between criminal 
and immigration law, sparking debate over the role of state and local police in 
enforcing federal immigration laws.17 
Within this context, state, city, and local authorities (sub-federal authorities) 
have pushed back against federal immigration enforcement through sanctuary 
policies.18 These policies take diverse forms, including law enforcement practic-
es that maintain confidentiality about immigration status, prohibit communica-
                                                                                                                           
Milczarek-Desai, supra, at 16; Hiroshi Motomura, Arguing About Sanctuary, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
435, 437 (2018). 
 15 See Massaro & Milczarek-Desai, supra note 14, at 16–17 (noting that the Sanctuary Movement 
began with churches in the 1980s that provided refuge to Salvadorans and Guatemalans fleeing vio-
lence in their home countries); Rodríguez, supra note 14, at 600–01 (explaining that cities and states 
followed the lead of churches and private organizations by passing resolutions to protect individuals 
in their jurisdictions from arrest). To be granted asylum, individuals must demonstrate that they were 
persecuted on account of one of five grounds: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or member-
ship in a particular social group. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). 
 16 See Cuison Villazor, supra note 1, at 576 (arguing that sanctuary city policies have helped 
create “local citizenship” for undocumented individuals in their immediate communities); Massaro & 
Milczarek-Desai, supra note 14, at 17 (contrasting the grassroots origins of the Sanctuary Movement 
with modern day jurisdictions’ use of formal laws and policies to incorporate immigrants). San Fran-
cisco, for example, declared itself a “City of Refuge” in 1985 as a way to voice its discontent with the 
federal government’s denial of asylum to, as well as the deportation of, large numbers of Central 
Americans. Cuison Villazor, supra note 1, at 583. In 1989, the city passed a local ordinance requiring 
its employees to maintain the confidentiality of immigration status information and prohibit the use of 
city funds to support federal immigration efforts. Id. 
 17 Lai & Lasch, supra note 14, at 544–45 (noting that the characterization of immigration as a 
public safety concern led to significant changes in immigration law and resulted in a new area of law 
enforcement known as “crimmigration”). Several key historical events contributed to this shifting 
narrative, particularly the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. See Stubblefield, supra note 1, at 
542 (explaining that augmented national security concerns following the attacks led to a stricter immi-
gration enforcement framework). In response to new federal policies, the modern sanctuary movement 
gained renewed support. Id. For example, as of 2016, some 300 jurisdictions did not comply with U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainers. Id. at 544. 
 18 Lai & Lasch, supra note 14, at 545 (describing sanctuary policies as a form of resistance to the 
increased overlap between criminal and immigration law over the last four decades). Sanctuary poli-
cies developed in four historical “waves.” Id. The first wave was in the 1980s, as local law enforce-
ment opposed what they viewed as unreasonable federal immigration policies. Id. at 546. The second 
developed as a response to laws passed in the 1990s, including the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Id. The 
third wave was a response to the “Secure Communities” program, which automatically shared bio-
metric data taken at jails with federal immigration authorities and contributed to massive deportation 
figures during the Obama administration. Id. at 546–47. The fourth wave developed after the presiden-
tial election of Donald Trump in response to the nativism underpinning his immigration policies. Id. at 
548. 
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tion with federal immigration authorities about the release of noncitizens, and 
limit compliance with immigration detainers.19 
Frustrated federal authorities have sought to restrain sanctuary policies and 
ensure sub-federal cooperation through legislation.20 At the center of these ef-
forts is 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which prohibits sub-federal authorities from refusing to 
maintain immigration status information or to share that information with federal 
immigration authorities.21 Between 2015 and 2016, Congress proposed multiple 
bills requiring state and local compliance with § 1373 as a condition of federal 
funding, but none succeeded.22 Facing a lack of legislative success, federal agen-
cies contemplated conditioning certain federal grant monies themselves to secure 
sub-federal cooperation with immigration priorities.23 
B. The Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program 
In 2006, Congress created the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance 
Grant Program (Byrne JAG Grant Program or Byrne JAG Grants).24 The Byrne 
JAG Grant Program represents the main federal funding source for state and lo-
                                                                                                                           
 19 See City of Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2020) (listing various examples of 
sanctuary city policies); Lasch et al., supra note 1, at 1707 (mentioning five categories of sanctuary 
policies, including: banning law enforcement investigations into criminal immigration offenses, refus-
ing to comply with immigration detainers, refusing jail access to ICE, promoting confidentiality relat-
ed to immigration status, and prohibiting joint investigations between local law enforcement and fed-
eral immigration authorities). Immigration detainers ask local law enforcement to keep noncitizens in 
jail past their release date so that federal authorities can detain them for immigration purposes. Provi-
dence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 29. 
 20 PECK, supra note 2, at 14. In 1996, Congress enacted legislation to help counteract local gov-
ernments’ policies of limiting information-sharing with federal immigration authorities, namely the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act and IIRAIRA. Id. 
 21 8 U.S.C. § 1373. 
 22 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 29; see Lai & Lasch, supra note 14, at 552–53 (describing the 
2015 “Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act” that would have withheld funding for multiple fed-
eral grants from jurisdictions that violated 8 U.S.C. § 1373 and noting that Congress proposed a total 
of eight similar bills between 2015 and 2016). See generally § 1373 (prohibiting policies that limit the 
sharing of immigration status information with federal authorities). 
 23 Lai & Lasch, supra note 14, at 554 (noting that Congress’s failure to pass legislation requiring 
immigration enforcement as a condition of federal funding led Texas Representative John Culberson to 
push the executive branch to impose such conditions through agency action). In a February 2016 letter, 
Congressman Culberson urged the Attorney General to require certification of § 1373 compliance from 
jurisdictions applying for three DOJ grant programs—Byrne JAG Grants, the Community Oriented Po-
licing Services Program (COPS), and the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP). Id. Created 
in 1994, COPS aimed to promote community involvement in crime prevention, but instead program 
monies have gone in large part toward officer hiring. Id. at 553, 598. The SCAAP grant program reim-
burses localities for jailing “undocumented criminal aliens.” Id. at 554. 
 24 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 27 (providing an overview of the Byrne JAG Grant Program 
and how it is administered); Peter Margulies, Deconstructing “Sanctuary Cities”: The Legality of 
Federal Grant Conditions That Require State and Local Cooperation on Immigration Enforcement, 
75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1507, 1562 (2018) (noting that Congress created the Byrne JAG Grant Pro-
gram by merging the preexisting Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Program 
with Local Law Enforcement Block Grants). 
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cal criminal justice programs.25 The DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs adminis-
ters the grant program and is led by the Assistant Attorney General (AAG).26 
Congress articulated the Byrne JAG Grant Program in 34 U.S.C. § 10151 
to 10156 (Byrne JAG Statute).27 The statute establishes the program as a formula 
grant that calculates award amounts based on relative state populations and rates 
of violent crimes.28 Grants may vary from the formula if recipients fail to com-
ply with one of the following federal mandates: (1) creating a sex offender regis-
try, (2) sharing records with a national criminal background check database, or 
(3) reporting deaths of individuals in custody.29 
When state and local government entities apply for Byrne JAG funding, 
they must provide a list of assurances for each grant year covered.30 For exam-
                                                                                                                           
 25 Monika Chawla, Catch Me If You Can: The Federal Government’s Long-Winded Chase to 
Round Up Immigrants and Defund Sanctuary Cities, 65 VILL. L. REV. 191, 203 (2020); Lai & Lasch, 
supra note 14, at 590–91. Law enforcement entities use Byrne JAG Grants toward programming in 
any of eight categories: law enforcement; prosecution and court; prevention and education; corrections 
and community corrections; drug treatment and enforcement; planning, evaluation, and technology 
improvement; crime victims and witnesses; and mental health. 34 U.S.C. § 10152(a)(1)(A)–(G). 
 26 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 27. See generally About Us, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF 
JUSTICE PROGRAMS, https://www.ojp.gov/about [https://perma.cc/DJB8-CPWR] (describing the Of-
fice of Justice Programs, a federal agency under the purview of the DOJ, as focused on building crim-
inal justice system capacity nationwide and helping the country better address crime and support vic-
tims). The Office of the AAG oversees the Office of Justice Programs, coordinating its various bu-
reaus and creating policies that reflect executive and legislative priorities. See Office of the Assistant 
Attorney General (OAAG), U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, https://www.ojp.
gov/about/offices/office-assistant-attorney-general-oaag [https://perma.cc/KQ7V-J2NY]. 
 27 34 U.S.C. §§ 10151–10156. Section 10151 establishes the name of the Byrne JAG Grant Pro-
gram. Id. § 10151. Section 10152 describes the grant program, including the types of authorized and 
prohibited uses of grant monies, program assessment, and the grant period. Id. § 10152. Section 10153 
describes the application process, including the types of assurances and certifications that applicants 
must make. Id. § 10153. Section 10154 explains the application review process. Id. § 10154. Section 
10155 explains how the Attorney General will develop rules to implement the statute. Id. § 10155. 
Finally, § 10156 describes the grant formula for determining awards. Id. § 10156. 
 28 Id. § 10156(a)–(b) (requiring that 60% of grants go to states and 40% to localities); see Provi-
dence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 27 (noting that, in determining grant award amounts, the DOJ must comply 
with the formula established in the Byrne JAG Statute, rather than make its own discretionary deci-
sions). Formula grants are typically available to all state applicants who agree to abide by a certain set 
of requirements. Eloise Pasachoff, Agency Enforcement of Spending Clause Statutes: A Defense of the 
Funding Cut-Off, 124 YALE. L.J. 248, 268 (2014) (comparing formula grants with grants that require 
applicants to compete for funding). As the name implies, the amount of funding allocated to formula 
grant recipients is determined by a congressionally set formula that considers a range of factors. Id. 
For example, for Byrne JAG Grants allocated to states, 50% is appropriated based on the ratio of the 
state’s population to the total U.S. population. 34 U.S.C. § 10156(a)(1)(A). The other 50% is based on 
the ratio of the state’s average yearly number of “part 1 violent crimes” over the past three years to the 
national average crime rate for those same crimes and years. Id. § 10156(a)(1)(B). For allocations to 
local governments, a similar formula is followed, but instead it compares the local government appli-
cant’s reported rate of “part 1 violent crimes” with the rate reported by all local government units in 
that state. Id. § 10156(d)(2)(A). Part 1 violent crimes are those defined by the FBI’s Uniform Crime 
Reports. Id. § 10156(a)(1)(B)(i). 
 29 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 28. 
 30 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(1)–(6). 
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ple, applicants must indicate that they will abide by the requirements of 34 
U.S.C. § 10153(a)(4) (the “data reporting provision”), § 10153(a)(5)(C) (the 
“coordination provision”), and § 10153(a)(5)(D) (the “applicable laws provi-
sion”).31 The DOJ notifies grant recipients of their selection in an award letter, in 
which it typically attaches some special conditions to the grant.32 
C. Factual and Procedural History of Providence v. Barr 
In July 2017, the DOJ announced new conditions on Byrne JAG Grants 
aimed at increasing information sharing between local law enforcement and fed-
eral immigration authorities.33 Sanctuary jurisdictions across the nation quickly 
challenged the conditions in court.34 Providence and Central Falls, Rhode Island, 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 28 (citing §§ 10153(a)(4), (5)(C)–(D)). To comply with the re-
porting requirement, applicants must “maintain and report such data, records, and information (pro-
grammatic and financial) as the Attorney General may reasonably require.” Id. (quoting § 10153(a)(4)). 
To comply with the coordination requirement, applicants must certify that “there has been appropriate 
coordination with affected agencies.” Id. (quoting § 10153(a)(5)(C)). To comply with the certification 
requirement, applicants must confirm that they “will comply with all provisions of this part and all 
other applicable Federal laws.” Id. (quoting § 10153(a)(5)(D)). 
 32 Id. (providing that “special conditions” are typically related to the recipients’ grant administra-
tion or their compliance with federal guidelines, regulations, and policies). For example, special con-
ditions might require grantees to collect data on their funded initiatives, participate in DOJ events, or 
comply with federal nondiscrimination guidelines. Id. 
 33 See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Off. of Pub. Aff., No. 17-826 Attorney General Sessions 
Announces Immigration Compliance Requirements for Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance 
Grant Programs (July 25, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-announces-
immigration-compliance-requirements-edward-byrne-memorial [https://perma.cc/GEL3-UP57] (an-
nouncing that the DOJ would notify Fiscal Year 2017 grant recipients of new immigration enforce-
ment-related conditions); see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BACKGROUNDER ON GRANT REQUIREMENTS 
(2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/984346/download [https://perma.cc/BYY9-
H4PB] (accompanying the press release with further details about the new conditions). In 2016, the 
DOJ’s Inspector General published a memorandum identifying sanctuary jurisdictions and suggesting 
that many of their policies may have violated 8 U.S.C. § 1373. Memorandum from Michael Horowitz, 
Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Just., to Karol V. Mason, Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Off. of Just. Programs, 
re: Dep’t of Just. Referral of Allegations of Potential Violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 by Grant Recipi-
ents 1 (May 31, 2016). The Inspector General found that all ten of the jurisdictions that the memoran-
dum focused on had limited their compliance with ICE detainers in some way. Id. at 4. Following this 
report, the DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs issued guidance to Byrne JAG and other federal grant 
program recipients in 2016, requiring certification of compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 as an assur-
ance required of grant applicants. Lai & Lasch, supra note 14, at 556. In January 2017, upon taking 
office, President Donald Trump promptly issued an executive order directing the Attorney General to 
find § 1373 noncompliant jurisdictions ineligible for federal grant monies. Id. at 557. This order was 
quickly challenged in court, and, in April 2017, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California granted a nationwide preliminary injunction, finding that it probably exceeded constitution-
al spending limits. Id. at 559. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s decision. 
Id. 
 34 See Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 23; New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 84 (2d 
Cir. 2020); City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931, 931 (9th Cir. 2019); City of Philadelphia v. 
Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d 276, 276 (3d Cir. 2019); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 272 (7th Cir. 
2018), reh’g en banc granted in part on other grounds, vacated in part on other grounds, No. 17-
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two cities that had been awarded Byrne JAG grants for over a decade, were 
among the challengers.35 
When the cities received their award letters for Fiscal Year 2017 grants, 
they encountered three new conditions that mirrored those outlined in the July 
2017 DOJ materials: the “notice,” “access,” and “§ 1373 certification” condi-
tions.36 The notice condition required the cities to provide immigration authori-
ties with advance notice of an alien’s scheduled release date and time.37 The ac-
cess condition required the cities to give federal immigration authorities access 
to their correctional facilities to allow them to question aliens about their right to 
be or remain in the United States.38 Finally, the § 1373 certification condition 
required the cities to certify their compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.39 Section 
                                                                                                                           
2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018), reh’g en banc vacated, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 
4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018); see also Andrew F. Moore, Introduction to the Symposium on 
Sanctuary Cities: A Brief Review of the Legal Landscape, 96 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 7 (2018) 
(detailing several cities’ subsequent legal challenges to the conditions). 
 35 Brief for Appellees at 9, Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23 (2020) (No. 19-1802). The city of 
Providence used past Byrne JAG Grants for police training and patrols in high crime areas. Id. Central 
Falls had become especially reliant on JAG grants following its 2011 bankruptcy and used past grants 
to upgrade the police department’s security and technology systems. Id. When the cities applied for 
Fiscal Year 2017 Byrne JAG Grants, Providence planned to use the funds to pay overtime, hire a 
bilingual police liaison, and purchase advertisements. Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 29. Central 
Falls intended to use the grant for its police force’s information technology needs. Id. The DOJ of-
fered Providence and Central Falls awards of $212,112 and $28,677 respectively. Id. 
 36 See Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 29–30 (noting that to comply with the notice and access 
conditions, grant recipients had to create a “law, policy, or practice” that ensured their compliance, 
and, to comply with the § 1373 certification condition, recipients had to submit a required “Certifica-
tion of Compliance” to demonstrate they were in conformity with this law); see also DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, BACKGROUNDER ON GRANT REQUIREMENTS, supra note 33 (outlining the requirements of the 
notice, access, and § 1373 certification conditions). 
 37 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 29; Brief for Appellees, supra note 35, at 8; Brief for Appel-
lants at 10, Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23 (2020) (No. 19-1802). The term “alien” as used in the 
notice and access conditions is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101 as “any person not a citizen or national of 
the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101. The widespread use of this term in U.S. immigration law has 
been criticized for creating a psychological and legal divide between citizens and noncitizens. See 
Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of 
Nonpersons, 28 U. MIA. INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 267, 269, 273 (explaining how current terminology 
in immigration law characterizes citizens as persons with dignity and rights, and noncitizens as aliens 
who lack these basic rights) (emphasis added). The use of “alien” legitimizes divergent treatment of 
noncitizens not only in the legal sphere, but in society at large, too. Id. at 273. Upon taking office in 
January 2021, President Biden instructed immigration authorities to begin using “noncitizen” in place 
of “alien,” and urged for this change to be codified into law. Alison Durkee, ‘Aliens’ No More: Biden 




 38 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 29–30; Brief for Appellees, supra note 35, at 8; Brief for Ap-
pellants, supra note 37, at 10. 
 39 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 30. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (prohibiting government 
entities at any level from restricting the sending or receiving of immigration status or citizenship in-
formation with federal immigration authorities). 
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1373 prohibits government entities at the federal, state, and local level from im-
peding communication with federal immigration authorities about immigration 
status information.40 
These conditions conflicted with sanctuary policies in both cities.41 As 
such, the cities declined to comply and sued the DOJ in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Rhode Island.42 They argued that the conditions violated the 
separation of powers, the Tenth Amendment, the Spending Clause, and were 
ultra vires and arbitrary and capricious agency actions.43 The cities moved for 
partial summary judgment and sought to permanently enjoin the DOJ from im-
posing the challenged conditions.44 They also sought mandamus relief to require 
                                                                                                                           
 40 8 U.S.C. § 1373. 
 41 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 30; see Brief for Appellees, supra note 35, at 11–12 (explain-
ing that Providence’s Community Police Relations Act prohibited police inquiries about immigration 
status, and Central Falls’s Police Department had a policy of noncompliance with ICE detainers that 
required officers to hold individuals beyond their eligible release time). 
 42 See City of Providence v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 160 (D.R.I. 2019), aff’d, 954 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 
2020). 
 43 Providence v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 163 (listing the various counts that the cities raised in 
their complaint). Providence and Central Falls argued that the conditions represented ultra vires agen-
cy conduct because the DOJ acted beyond its statutory authority in imposing them. Amended Com-
plaint at 31–33, City of Providence v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 160 (D.R.I. 2019) (No. 1:18-cv-00437-
JJM-LDA); see Ultra Vires, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (describing ultra vires con-
duct as “unauthorized” or “beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by 
law”). The cities also argued that the DOJ violated the Spending Clause and the separation of powers 
principles because, by creating the grant conditions, it had taken Congress’s constitutionally allocated 
spending power into its own hands. See Amended Complaint, supra, at 30, 31, 37, 38 (listing Counts 
I, V, and VI as violations of the separation of powers and the spending clause). See generally U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (conferring spending powers to Congress). The cities further argued that the 
DOJ violated the Tenth Amendment by improperly impinging on powers reserved to the states when 
implementing the challenged conditions. See Amended Complaint, supra, at 35–36. See generally 
U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving to the states or the people those rights not explicitly delegated to the 
federal government). Whereas the federal government is generally recognized as exercising authority 
over immigration, the states retain general police powers and define their own criminal laws. See 
Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d 276, 281 (2019) (comparing broad federal authority over immi-
gration with states’ authority over criminal law); cf. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRA-
TION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 236 (8th ed. 2016) (pointing out that although modern 
jurisprudence recognizes the federal government’s power over immigration matters, it was not until 
1891 that the administration of immigration laws shifted from states to the federal government). See 
generally D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIA. L. REV. 471, 
473, 477 (2004) (discussing the evolving interpretation of police powers). “Police powers” generally 
refer to state regulatory authority, such as the ability to pass state laws, punish crimes, and regulate 
commerce within state borders. Id. Further, the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine, drawn from the Tenth 
Amendment, limits the federal government’s ability to force states to carry out federal regulatory 
schemes. See Motomura, supra note 14, at 446 (noting that sanctuary jurisdictions challenging federal 
enforcement policies have argued that the Tenth Amendment prohibits federal authorities from direct-
ly compelling the states or their officers from enforcing federal regulatory programs). 
 44 Providence v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 163. To enjoin means to legally prohibit a party from 
doing something by way of a court-ordered injunction. Enjoin, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 43. Courts grant permanent injunctions after hearing the merits of the case. See Injunction, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 43. 
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the DOJ to disburse the grant funds.45 The DOJ moved to dismiss and sought 
partial summary judgment as well.46 
In its decision, the district court focused solely on whether the DOJ had 
statutory authority to impose the immigration-related conditions on Providence 
and Central Falls’s grant awards.47 Ultimately, it held that the DOJ lacked such 
authority.48 The court granted the cities’ motion for partial summary judgment 
and required the DOJ to disburse the cities’ grants and issue new award letters 
free of the conditions.49 The DOJ appealed to the First Circuit.50 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE DOJ’S AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE 
IMMIGRATION-RELATED CONDITIONS ON BYRNE JAG GRANTS 
In March 2020, in City of Providence v. Barr, the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals became the most recent circuit court to consider the DOJ’s authority to 
impose immigration-related conditions on Byrne JAG grants.51 Section A of this 
Part discusses the Seventh, Third, and Ninth Circuits’ decisions to strike down 
the challenged conditions because they concluded that the DOJ lacked statutory 
authority to impose them.52 Section B analyzes the Second Circuit’s decision to 
uphold the conditions, creating a circuit split.53 Finally, Section C discusses the 
First Circuit’s analysis in Providence v. Barr, where it sided with the majority of 
circuits in concluding that the DOJ lacked legal authority to impose the chal-
lenged conditions.54 
                                                                                                                           
 45 Providence v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 163. Mandamus relief involves the court issuing a writ 
to “compel performance of a particular act by a lower court or governmental officer or body . . . to 
correct a prior action or failure to act.” Mandamus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 43. 
 46 Providence v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 165. 
 47 Id. at 163. The court referred to the issue of statutory authorization as a “threshold issue.” Id. It 
noted that if the DOJ lacked statutory authority to impose the challenged conditions, the court did not 
need to address the constitutional issues and claims of ultra vires and arbitrary and capricious agency 
conduct. Id. 
 48 Id. at 163–64. In reaching this outcome, the court was particularly persuaded by the Third Cir-
cuit, which held, in 2019, in City of Philadelphia v. Attorney General, that: (1) a broad power to with-
hold all of a grantee’s grant money lacked textual support in the Byrne JAG Statute; (2) neither the 
data reporting, coordination, nor applicable laws provisions of that same statute could be read to au-
thorize the challenged conditions; and (3) the duties of the AAG, particularly as enumerated in the 
special conditions clause of 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6) did not authorize the conditions. Id. See general-
ly City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2019), reh’g denied (June 24, 2019) (hold-
ing that the DOJ lacked statutory authority for the challenged grant conditions). 
 49 Providence v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 165. The court likewise denied the DOJ’s cross-motion 
for partial summary judgment and enjoined the DOJ from imposing the challenged conditions. Id. 
 50 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 25. 
 51 City of Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 2020) (noting that at the time of trial, three 
circuit courts had struck down the challenged conditions whereas one circuit, the Second Circuit, had 
upheld them all). 
 52 See infra notes 55–79 and accompanying text. 
 53 See infra notes 80–87 and accompanying text. 
 54 See infra notes 88–112 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Seventh, Third, and Ninth Circuits Held the DOJ Lacked  
Statutory Authority to Impose the Challenged Conditions 
In April 2018, in City of Chicago v. Sessions, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals became the first circuit court to analyze the DOJ’s legal authority to 
impose the notice and access conditions imposed on Byrne JAG Grants.55 Given 
Congress’s power of the purse, the court reasoned that, for the DOJ to have le-
gally imposed these conditions, Congress must have authorized it to do so.56 
After acknowledging that the Byrne JAG Statute itself did not explicitly 
grant such power, the court analyzed the AAG’s powers, enumerated in 34 
U.S.C. § 10102(a).57 This provision gives the AAG authority to exercise func-
tions vested in them by Chapter 101 of Title 34 of the U.S. Code, or delegated to 
them by the Attorney General, “including placing special conditions on all 
grants, and determining priority purposes for formula grants.”58 In examining 
this special conditions clause, the Seventh Circuit considered the word “includ-
ing” particularly salient.59 The court reasoned that because it typically denotes 
                                                                                                                           
 55 City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 278 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted in part 
on other grounds, vacated in part on other grounds, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 
2018), reh’g en banc vacated, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018). The Seventh 
Circuit did not consider the 8 U.S.C. § 1373 certification condition. Id. 
 56 See id. at 277 (noting that a core issue in the case was the separation of powers). The court 
reasoned that if the executive branch can exercise both the power to create policy and to compel state 
and local governments to comply with it via coercive use of the spending power, meaningful checks 
on tyranny cease to exist. Id. Concluding that such a power disbalance was present in this case, the 
court stated that the Attorney General “used the sword of federal funding to conscript state and local 
authorities to aid in federal civil immigration enforcement.” Id. Congress’s power of the purse is un-
derstood as its ability to manage all revenue. Louis Fischer, Presidential Independence and the Power 
of the Purse, 3 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 107, 107 (1997). The Constitution establishes congres-
sional power over the purse by vesting Congress with the appropriations power, as well spending and 
taxing powers. See id. at 108 (noting the constitutional sources of the power of the purse); see also 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law”); id. § 8, cl. 1 (“Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general wel-
fare of the United States”); id. § 8, cl. 2 (establishing Congress’s power to borrow money on the Unit-
ed States’ credit). 
 57 Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d at 284. The Attorney General did not contest the lack of a statu-
tory grant of authority within the Byrne JAG Statute itself for his imposition of the immigration en-
forcement conditions. Id. Rather, the Attorney General “place[d] all his purported authorization in one 
statutory basket, pointing to 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6)” as the sole source of his grant-conditioning 
power. Id.; see 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a). 
 58 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6) (emphasis added) (the special conditions clause). Chapter 101 of Title 
34 of the U.S. Code is referred to collectively as Justice System Improvement. See generally id. 
§§ 10101–10741. Within Chapter 101, Subchapter I covers the Office of Justice Programs, spanning 
sections 10101 to 10111. Id. §§ 10101–10111. 
 59 See Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d at 284–85 (beginning with an analysis of the plain meaning 
of the text as the clearest reflection of congressional intent). The court pointed to the dictionary defini-
tion of “including,” which it noted “designate[s] that a person or thing is part of a particular group.” 
Id. at 284 (citation omitted). Courts often turn to the dictionary definitions of words for guidance, 
particularly where a phrase is ambiguous. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory 
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belonging to a group, this clause was not meant to give the AAG sweeping 
grant-conditioning authority.60 Instead, the court concluded that it established a 
limited class of powers that the AAG could employ only when Chapter 101 or 
the Attorney General delegated such power.61 The court also determined that the 
structure of 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a) supported its reading of the special conditions 
clause.62 It reasoned that a single “catch-all provision” at the end of a list of six 
provisions reciting the AAG’s explicit powers was an illogical place for Con-
gress to grant such extensive power.63 Finally, the court reasoned that a broad 
reading conflicted with the grant’s formula nature,64 and ran counter to congres-
sional intent, which aimed to maintain state and local government flexibility.65 
Finding no statutory source that gave the DOJ authority to impose the notice and 
access conditions, the court affirmed the district court’s decision in favor of the 
city.66 
In February 2019, in City of Philadelphia v. Attorney General, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals joined the Seventh Circuit in holding that the DOJ 
lacked the requisite statutory authority to impose all three challenged condi-
tions.67 The Third Circuit similarly held that the special conditions clause did not 
grant such authority.68 Unlike the Seventh Circuit, however, it also considered 
                                                                                                                           
Interpretation, 115 HARV L. REV 2085, 2103–04 (2002) (noting that courts not only rely on dictionary 
definitions, but also compare the use of a particular word to other uses of that word throughout the 
same statute and across different statutes). 
 60 Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d at 285. 
 61 Id. When reading “including” in the context of this particular statutory provision, the court held 
that it indicated “a subcategory of the types of powers and functions that the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral may exercise” when such powers are vested in him or her. Id. Therefore, the court concluded that 
the DOJ’s interpretation of this provision contradicted the statute’s plain meaning. Id. at 284. 
 62 Id. at 285. The court rejected the DOJ’s broad reading that would grant the AAG power to 
“impose any conditions he or she sees fit” on both Byrne JAG Grants and grants in other statutes. Id. 
at 284. The narrower reading that the court instead adopted limited the AAG’s grant-conditioning 
power to situations where that power is delegated to him or her by statute or by the Attorney General. 
Id. at 285. 
 63 Id. at 285, 287 (noting that Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes”) (citation omit-
ted). 
 64 See id. at 286 (remarking that because Congress outlined many funding apportionment specifi-
cations in the Byrne JAG Statute, it was unlikely that it meant to give the AAG broad authority to 
bypass the formula entirely). 
 65 Id. at 285. 
 66 Id. at 293. 
 67 City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 2019), reh’g denied (June 24, 
2019). At the time of the suit, Philadelphia had policies in place limiting city officials’ coordination 
with federal immigration authorities regarding access to local jails and information about the release 
of noncitizens. Id. at 282. 
 68 Id. at 288 (holding that 34 U.S.C. § 10102 did not authorize the challenged conditions in light 
of its text and structure); see 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6) (the special conditions clause). The Third Cir-
cuit, like the Seventh Circuit, held that the special conditions clause’s use of the word “including” 
signified that the power to place special conditions on grants should be understood as a mere subpart 
of the AAG’s ability to exercise powers when specifically vested in him or her by Chapter 101 of Title 
34 of the U.S. Code, or delegated by the Attorney General. See Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d at 
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the Byrne JAG Statute’s data reporting and coordination provisions as additional 
proffered sources of authority but determined that neither authorized the DOJ to 
impose the notice and access conditions.69 The data reporting provision, it rea-
soned, required grant recipients to report only “programmatic and financial” in-
formation, which did not include DOJ priorities independent from the Byrne 
JAG Grant Program, such as the challenged immigration conditions.70 Similarly, 
it observed that the coordination provision required only appropriate coordina-
tion regarding the grantee’s application, not ongoing coordination for unrelated 
issues.71 Finally, the court rejected the DOJ’s argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1373 
qualified as an “applicable law” under the applicable laws provision of the Byrne 
JAG Statute, which requires grant applicants to certify compliance with “all oth-
er applicable Federal laws.”72 The court therefore concluded that the DOJ lacked 
authority to impose the § 1373 certification condition on Philadelphia’s grant.73 
                                                                                                                           
287 (explaining that “including” indicates that something is part of a larger whole, which is helpful in 
understanding the special conditions clause’s meaning as part of the larger statutory provision); Chi-
cago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d at 284–85 (same). The Third Circuit also noted that § 10102’s structure 
supported a limited scope of the special conditions power, again mirroring the Seventh Circuit’s ra-
tionale in City of Chicago v. Sessions. See Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d at 288 (reasoning that 
it was unlikely that the special conditions clause granted broad grant conditioning powers given its 
placement at the end of a list of six subsections, the preceding of which explained purely ministerial 
powers); Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d at 285 (noting that a catch-all provision at the end of a list of 
the AAG’s coordination duties was an unlikely place to place a sweeping power allowing the AAG to 
condition any grants). 
 69 Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d at 285 (noting that the Attorney General’s reading of the 
data reporting and coordination provisions improperly extended their meanings); see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 10153(a)(4) (the data reporting provision) (requiring grant applicants to assure that they will main-
tain and report all data, records, and programmatic and financial information required by the Attorney 
General); id. § 10153(a)(5)(C) (the coordination provision) (requiring grant applicants to certify their 
coordination with impacted agencies). See generally Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d at 280, 284 (noting 
that the Byrne JAG Statute did not explicitly authorize the challenged conditions and focusing its 
analysis on the statute outlining the AAG’s duties and functions). 
 70 Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d at 285 (interpreting “programmatic and financial” infor-
mation from the data reporting provision of the Byrne JAG Statute to mean information about the 
funded grant program and the management of federal funding); see 8 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(4) (the data 
reporting provision). 
 71 Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d at 285 (noting the significance of the use of the past tense 
in the coordination provision—the requirement that there “‘has been’ appropriate coordination”—as 
indicative of a backward looking, rather than ongoing, requirement); see 8 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(C) 
(the coordination provision). 
 72 Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d at 288, 291; see 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(D) (the applica-
ble laws provision) (requiring prospective grantees to certify their compliance with all provisions in 
the same part of the statute, as well as with “all other applicable Federal laws”); 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (pre-
venting sub-federal government entities from prohibiting communication of immigration status infor-
mation to federal immigration authorities). The DOJ argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1373 qualified as an ap-
plicable federal law because it “applie[d] to local government entities.” Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 
916 F.3d at 288. In rejecting this proposition, the court considered the canon against surplusage. Id. at 
289. Under this doctrine, “every word and every provision in a legal instrument is to be given effect.” 
Surplusage Canon, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 43. The Third Circuit reasoned that to 
give meaning to the word “applicable” in the applicable laws provision, it must limit the federal laws 
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In October 2019, in City of Los Angeles v. Barr, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals joined the Seventh and Third Circuits in holding that the DOJ lacked 
statutory authority to impose the notice and access conditions on Los Angeles’s 
Byrne JAG Grant.74 Relying on reasoning similar to that of the Third Circuit, the 
Ninth Circuit rejected the proffered authority of the Byrne JAG Statute’s data 
reporting and coordination provisions.75 Although it ultimately rejected the spe-
cial conditions clause as authorizing the DOJ to impose the challenged condi-
tions in this particular case, as the Third and Seventh Circuits did, it arrived at 
that conclusion differently.76 The court rejected the city’s argument that the spe-
                                                                                                                           
in question in some meaningful way. Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d at 289 (noting that Con-
gress purposefully used the word “applicable,” when it could have written the statute to say that appli-
cants “must certify compliance with ‘all other Federal laws’”) (emphasis added). The court was also 
persuaded by the interpretive canon of noscitur a sociis, under which an ambiguous word or phrase’s 
meaning “should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it.” Noscitur a Sociis, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 43; see Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d at 289–90 (rea-
soning that the subsections surrounding the applicable laws provision all related to grant-funded pro-
grams, encouraging a narrower reading of the provision than one that would demand applicant cities’ 
compliance with every possibly applicable law). 
 73 Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d at 291. 
 74 City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931, 934 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 75 See id. at 944–45 (determining that the data reporting provision only required grantees to report 
“programmatic” information about Byrne JAG Grant-funded programs and that the coordination pro-
vision did not require ongoing coordination). Providing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
with notice of release of noncitizens to comply with the notice condition would require grant recipi-
ents to report information unrelated to their Byrne JAG-funded program, meaning it was not “pro-
grammatic.” Id. The court also highlighted that the notice condition’s contemplation of ad hoc report-
ing of noncitizen release information conflicted with the data reporting provision’s annual reporting 
requirement. Id. (emphasis added). In rejecting the coordination provision as a source of proffered 
statutory authority for the access condition, the court agreed with the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that 
the use of the past tense did not imply an ongoing coordination requirement. See id. at 945 (reasoning 
that the provision’s plain language did not demonstrate that grant applicants had to coordinate with 
DHS, an agency unrelated to their grant activities, nor do so for a continual time period); see also 
Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d at 285 (interpreting the coordination provision to “require certifi-
cation that there was appropriate coordination” related to a grant recipient’s application). 
 76 Compare Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d at 939 (concluding that the special conditions clause in 
§ 10102(a)(6) provided the DOJ with independent authority to place special conditions on grants), 
with City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 284–85 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted in part 
on other grounds, vacated in part on other grounds, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 
2018), reh’g en banc vacated, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (rejecting the 
DOJ’s argument that the special conditions clause gives the AAG authority to impose any grant condi-
tions and instead concluding more narrowly that it allows the AAG to do so if and when such power is 
vested in him or her by the statutory chapter or the Attorney General), and Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 
916 F.3d at 287–88 (same). The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in 2019 in City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 
particularly where it differed from that of the Third and Seventh Circuits, elicited a rather scathing 
concurrence. Id. at 945–46. In her concurrence, Judge Wardlaw argued that the majority, in dicta, 
unnecessarily found “vague, unidentified powers bestowed upon the DOJ,” and created a circuit split 
by employing an analysis not used by any other circuit court to consider this legal question. Id. at 946. 
(Wardlaw, J., concurring). The majority, Judge Wardlaw contended, misunderstood the Seventh and 
Third Circuits’ holdings. Id. She stated that these circuit courts went much further than rejecting a 
“broad interpretation” of the special conditions clause that would allow the DOJ to place any condi-
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cial conditions clause gave the DOJ no independent grant-conditioning authori-
ty.77 This, it reasoned, would render Congress’s 2006 amendment to the statue, 
which added the clause at issue, meaningless.78 The court recognized the power 
of the Attorney General, and the AAG by way of delegation, to specially condi-
tion all grants but held that, in this case, the challenged conditions were unlawful 
because they were neither “special conditions” nor “priority purposes” within the 
meaning of the statute.79 
B. The Second Circuit Upheld the DOJ’s Authority to Impose  
the Challenged Conditions, Creating a Circuit Split 
In February 2020, in State of New York v. U.S. Department of Justice, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals split from its sister courts when it held that the 
DOJ was statutorily authorized to impose the notice, access, and § 1373 certifi-
cation conditions.80 It disagreed with the Third Circuit regarding the applicable 
                                                                                                                           
tions on Byrne JAG Grants. Id. Instead, they much more narrowly held that the special conditions 
clause failed to provide “any independent grant of authority.” Id. The majority disagreed with what it 
considered Judge Wardlaw’s “strawman argument.” Id. at 943 (majority opinion). The majority char-
acterized her argument as failing to grasp its actual holding and to demonstrate how it caused a circuit 
split. Id. 
 77 Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d at 939; see 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6) (the special conditions 
clause). 
 78 Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d at 939. The 2006 amendment came as part of the 2005 Violence 
Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act. Id. at 938. Prior to the 2006 amend-
ment, § 10102(a)(6) authorized the AAG to “exercise such other powers and functions as may be 
vested in [him or her] pursuant to this title or by delegation of the Attorney General.” Id. at 939. The 
amendment added the following phrase at the end: “including placing special conditions on all grants 
and determining priority purposes for formula grants.” Id. The Ninth Circuit considered this amend-
ment particularly salient, noting that the presumption is that Congress “makes amendments with pur-
pose.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 79 Id. at 944. In reaching its interpretation of “special conditions,” which the court defined as “the 
power to impose tailored requirements when necessary, such as when a grantee is ‘high-risk,’” the 
court looked to the regulatory meaning of “special conditions.” Id. at 941. In that context, “special 
conditions” meant “individualized requirements included in a specific grant, as set forth in 28 C.F.R. 
§ 66.12(a)(5) (2006).” Id. The court concluded that “priority purposes” must be derived from the pur-
poses for Byrne JAG Grants, outlined in 8 U.S.C. § 10152(a)(1), such as providing training and 
equipment for law enforcement. Id. at 942. 
 80 New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 123 (2d Cir. 2020). The Second Circuit also 
considered constitutional issues not addressed by the other circuits. See id. at 112 (rejecting the district 
court’s finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1373 violates the Tenth Amendment). The court concluded that the 
§ 1373 certification condition, as applied to the issue of a federal funding requirement in this case, did 
not violate the anticommandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 114.The court distin-
guished this case from the landmark anticommandeering case, National Federation of Independent 
Businesses v. Sebelius, decided in 2012, reasoning that the proportion of funding that Byrne JAG 
grant recipients risked losing by failing to comply with federal grant conditions did not present risks 
for federal coercion of state and local governments to the same degree seen in Sebelius. Id. at 115–16. 
Compare Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 685 (2012) (noting that the Medicaid 
funds at issue amounted to over 10% of the entire annual budget for most states), with New York v. 
Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d at 116 (noting that the potential loss to New York and Massachusetts for fail-
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laws provision of the Byrne JAG Statute, holding that it did authorize the DOJ to 
impose the § 1373 certification condition.81 The Second Circuit reasoned that an 
“applicable” federal law includes not only laws pertinent to the grant program 
itself but also those applicable to the grant-seeking entity.82 Because § 1373 ap-
plied to the plaintiffs, the DOJ was authorized to impose the condition.83 
The court also found statutory authority for the notice condition in the Byr-
ne JAG Statute’s data reporting and coordination provisions.84 The court rea-
soned that information related to noncitizens’ release dates was in fact “pro-
grammatic” under the data reporting provision.85 It also concluded that the coor-
dination provision’s requirement that grantees appropriately coordinate with im-
pacted agencies meant that they must do so throughout the whole grant period.86 
The court held that the Department of Homeland Security’s requirement that 
                                                                                                                           
ing to comply with the Byrne JAG immigration-related conditions was less than 0.1% of their annual 
state budgets). The Second Circuit reached this constitutional question because the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1373 was unconstitutional on its face 
and, therefore, could not be considered under the applicable laws provision of the Byrne JAG Statute. 
New York v. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d at 111. The Second Circuit lamented the need to address the 
constitutional issue in light of judicial restraint, noting that the lower court, having already found that 
the § 1373 certification condition violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), could have 
avoided the Tenth Amendment challenge. Id. Yet, because the Second Circuit came out differently 
than the district court by holding that the DOJ was statutorily authorized to impose the certification 
condition, the court was compelled to address the argument. Id. The Second Circuit also concluded 
that the conditions were not arbitrarily and capriciously imposed in violation of the APA. Id. at 122. It 
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the conditions represented a shift in the DOJ’s position that 
lacked adequate reasoning. Id. at 123. The court reasoned that the DOJ’s position had not in fact 
changed and that, even if the agency needed to show the reasons behind its new policy, it did so 
through its 2016 report on the cooperation challenges facing law enforcement and immigration author-
ities. Id. at 123. 
 81 Compare New York v. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d at 106 (rejecting the Third Circuit’s rationale 
that a broad reading of “applicable” in the applicable laws provision would implicate an issue of sur-
plusage), with Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d at 291 (determining that the applicable laws provi-
sion of the Byrne JAG Statute did not provide authority for the challenged § 1373 certification condi-
tion). 
 82 New York v. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d at 105. The court noted that rather than limiting the mean-
ing of “applicable” in the provision “all other applicable Federal laws,” the adjective “all” should be 
understood to broaden its meaning. Id. at 106. 
 83 Id. at 111. 
 84 Id. at 121. 
 85 Id. at 117. The court noted that such information was programmatic at least insofar as it related 
“in any way to the criminal prosecution, incarceration, or release of persons.” Id. The court deter-
mined that this would include nearly all of the programs that Byrne JAG Grant applicants can apply 
for, including, for example, task forces aimed at combatting specific crimes and prosecutors and de-
fenders programs, because each involves aspects of arrest, prosecution or defense, and incarceration. 
Id. 
 86 See id. at 118 (reasoning that the dictionary definition of “coordination” implied some kind of 
ongoing conduct). The court noted that coordination was not a “static concept,” but rather, a “relation 
and sequence” of actors and actions. Id. The court contrasted its holding with that of the Third Circuit, 
which concluded that the coordination provision only required coordination with impacted agencies at 
the time of the grant application. Id. 
II.-118 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
grantees provide notice about noncitizens’ release dates constituted the type of 
ongoing coordination that the coordination provision contemplated.87 
C. The First Circuit Sided with the Majority of Circuits in Providence v. Barr 
In March 2020, in City of Providence v. Barr, the First Circuit joined the 
majority of circuits in holding that the DOJ lacked statutory authority for all 
three of the challenged conditions.88 The DOJ argued that (1) the data reporting 
provision, (2) the coordination provision, and (3) the applicable laws provision 
of the Byrne JAG Statute, as well as (4) the special conditions clause of the stat-
ute outlining the AAG’s duties and functions, gave it authority to impose the 
challenged conditions.89 
The court began by considering the data reporting provision of the Byrne 
JAG Statute.90 It concluded that this provision only authorized the DOJ to re-
quire reporting about either the grant program itself or its funded activities.91 It 
reasoned that the DOJ’s interpretation of “programmatic” in this provision con-
tradicted the use of “program” and “programmatic” throughout the statute.92 The 
DOJ’s interpretation, the court noted, would erroneously cover grant recipients’ 
activities in any Byrne JAG program category, regardless of whether their fund-
ing was designated for that activity.93 
Turning to the coordination provision’s requirement that applicants “coor-
dinat[e] with affected agencies,” the court held that this only covered the coordi-
nation needed to prepare the grant application.94 The provision’s use of the past 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See id. at 121 (concluding that the DHS was an “affected agency” as specified in the coordina-
tion provision because grants related to “prosecution, incarceration or release” of individuals in custo-
dy would affect the department’s ability to initiate removal proceedings against noncitizens). 
 88 City of Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23, 27 (1st Cir. 2020) (noting that despite the DOJ’s 
“kitchen-sink-full of clever legal arguments,” it had exceeded its authority when it imposed the immi-
gration-related conditions); see Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931, 944–45 (9th Cir. 2019) (striking 
down the challenged conditions); Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d at 279 (same); Chicago v. Ses-
sions, 888 F.3d at 293 (same). 
 89 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 32, 39; Brief for Appellants, supra note 37, at 13, 15; see 34 
U.S.C. § 10153(a)(4) (data reporting provision); id. § 10153(a)(5)(C) (coordination provision); id. 
§ 10153(a)(5)(D) (applicable laws provision); id. § 10102(a)(6) (duties and functions of the AAG). 
 90 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 35; see 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(4) (the data reporting provision 
of the Byrne JAG Statute). 
 91 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 35. 
 92 See id. at 32 (noting that throughout the Byrne JAG Statute, “program” consistently referred 
only to the grant program or the grant-funded activity); see also § 10153(a)(4) (requiring that appli-
cants report programmatic and financial information, as required by the Attorney General). The data 
reporting provision’s application to the “fiscal year” of the grant application lent further support for 
the court’s narrow reading of “programmatic,” as the temporal aspect of the grant application period 
pointed specifically to the grant program and its funded activities. Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 33. 
 93 See Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 32–33 (noting that the DOJ offered no reasonable explana-
tion for why the court should interpret “programmatic” in the data reporting provision any differently 
from its use throughout the rest of the Byrne JAG statute). 
 94 Id. at 33. 
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tense showed that continual coordination beyond this period was not required.95 
Further, the court held that the provision only required coordination with agen-
cies that were impacted specifically by the applicants’ funded programs.96 In 
contrast, the type of coordination with immigration authorities that the DOJ 
sought through the notice and access conditions related neither to the grant pro-
gram nor its proposed activities.97 The court also concluded that the location of 
these two provisions showed Congress did not intend for them to give the DOJ 
broad power to impose its own “unrelated law enforcement priorities.”98 The 
court rejected the DOJ’s argument that these provisions authorized its imposition 
of the notice and access conditions on funding specifically for grant programs 
related to custody and prosecution.99 
Next, considering the applicable laws provision as a proffered source of au-
thority for the § 1373 certification condition, the court considered “applicable” 
ambiguous and turned to legislative intent.100 Noting that Congress would not 
have included this word unless it meant to narrow the laws that the provision 
applied to, the court rejected the DOJ’s interpretation, which would cover all 
laws pertinent to grant applicants and “germane to the grant.”101 The court rea-
soned that this reading would render the inclusion of “applicable” meaning-
less.102 The court favored a narrower interpretation: applicable federal laws were 
those that applied to governments “in their capacities” as grantees.103 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Id. Using reasoning similar to that of the Seventh, Third, and Ninth Circuits, the First Circuit 
highlighted that the coordination provision requires that there “has been” coordination among appli-
cants and affected agencies. Id. 
 96 Id. The court rejected the DOJ’s interpretation of this provision, which would require appli-
cants to coordinate with any law enforcement body that was impacted in any way by their activities. 
Id. 
 97 Id. at 35. 
 98 Id. at 34. The court noted that these provisions are listed among other assurances grant appli-
cants must make about their applications. Id. 
 99 Id. at 35 (concluding that such a broad reading of the “programmatic” information would es-
sentially cover nearly all law enforcement activities and rejecting such a “capacious view” of this 
provision). The court maintained that although proposed activities in other grant applications may be 
sufficiently related to the release of noncitizens to warrant the notice and access conditions, this was 
not the case for Providence and Central Falls, whose grants were in no way related to removing 
noncitizens from the United States. Id. at 36. 
 100 See id. at 36 (stating that the dictionary definition of “applicable” did little to illuminate its 
meaning in the statute). Considering the formula nature of the Byrne JAG grant, the court concluded 
that it was unlikely that “Congress intended to give the DOJ so universal a trump card” as made pos-
sible under the DOJ’s broad reading of the applicable laws provision. See id. at 38 (noting that the 
DOJ’s interpretation of the applicable laws provision would give it significant ability to diverge from 
the grant’s formula requirements); see also § 10153(a)(5)(D) (the applicable laws provision of the 
Byrne JAG Statute). 
 101 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 36–37. 
 102 Id. at 37. The court rejected the Second Circuit’s reading of the applicable laws provision, 
determining that it defied the canon against surplusage. Id. See generally Surplusage, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra, note 43 (defining the canon against surplusage as giving effect to every word of 
a legal provision). The court reasoned that Congress could have simply drafted the statute to require 
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Finally, the court considered the AAG’s duties and functions in 34 U.S.C. 
§ 10102 as another proffered source of authority.104 The DOJ argued that the 
special conditions clause granted it independent authority to place special condi-
tions on all Office of Justice Programs-administered grants.105 The court disa-
greed.106 It held that the statute’s plain meaning, the grant’s formula nature, and 
the use of “special conditions” as a term of art made this provision merely illus-
trative of the types of powers the AAG could exercise if and when vested with 
such power.107 
Specifically, the court reasoned that “special conditions,” which the statute 
does not define, was a term of art that should be imbued with the meaning typi-
cally given to this term.108 The DOJ and other federal agencies often placed spe-
cial conditions on “high risk” grantees who they identified as such due to finan-
cial challenges or problems complying with previous grant requirements.109 
Therefore, “special conditions,” as used in the special conditions clause, meant 
“individualized requirements” related to high-risk grant recipients, not require-
ments to be imposed broadly on all Byrne JAG grant recipients.110 The court 
also concluded that, under the canon of noscitur a sociis, the inclusion of the 
                                                                                                                           
applicants to comply with “all other federal laws.” Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 37. Therefore, its 
decision to include “applicable” demonstrated that it meant to specify only a portion of federal laws. 
Id. The Second Circuit, in contrast, relied on the dictionary definition of “applicable” and noted that 
the use of “all” before “applicable” reflected legislative intent to give this word its broadest meaning. 
New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 106 (2d Cir. 2020). The First Circuit also rejected the 
Second Circuit’s conclusion that the DOJ had extensive authority to establish which applicants even 
qualified for grant funding. Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 39. It noted that the statutory language 
listing specific assurances that applicants must make to be grant-eligible did not reflect congressional 
intent to allow the DOJ to establish disconnected qualifications just to further its own goals. Id. 
 103 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 37. 
 104 Id. (determining that, although ultimately unsuccessful, the statute was the DOJ’s most con-
vincing argument); see 34 U.S.C. § 10102 (defining the duties of the Assistant Attorney General). 
 105 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 40. 
 106 Id. at 41. 
 107 Id. at 40, 42–43. In considering the statutory text, the court looked to the dictionary definition 
of “including,” which indicates a subset of information. Id. at 40. It determined that the special condi-
tions clause’s plain meaning therefore demonstrated that placing special conditions on grants was 
merely an example of a power that the AAG may exercise if and when vested with such power. Id. at 
40–41. The court also reasoned that the formula nature of the Byrne JAG Grant Program was incon-
sistent with a broader reading of the special conditions clause. Id. at 42. This interpretation was 
backed by its conclusion that “special conditions” was a term of art and should therefore be under-
stood as having the same meaning as it had in other statutes. Id. at 43. The court determined that “spe-
cial conditions” in other legislative provisions generally meant “individualized requirements imposed 
on a specific grant.” Id. at 44. See generally § 10102(a)(6) (giving the AAG the authority to exercise 
certain powers vested in or delegated to the AAG, including the power to impose special conditions 
and determine key purposes for particular grants). 
 108 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 43. 
 109 Id. The court noted that a regulation allowing the DOJ to place special conditions on high risk 
grant recipients existed when § 10102(a)(6) was amended and that similar regulations governed other 
federal agencies, like the Department of Education and the Department of Agriculture. Id. 
 110 Id. at 44; see 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6) (the special conditions clause). 
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special conditions clause at the end of a list of otherwise administrative duties 
made it unlikely that Congress meant to grant such broad authority there.111 Fi-
nally, the court rejected the DOJ’s argument that failing to read this clause broad-
ly would strip all meaning from the 2006 amendment to this provision.112 
III. THE FIRST CIRCUIT RESPECTED PLAIN MEANING AND LEGISLATIVE 
INTENT BY ALIGNING WITH THE MAJORITY APPROACH 
In March 2020, in City of Providence v. Barr, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit’s thoughtful analysis of the Byrne JAG Statute and the statute 
setting forth the duties and functions of the AAG respected the plain meaning of 
and congressional intent behind these statutes.113 Section A of this Part discusses 
why the First Circuit was right to reject the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit’s interpretation of the data reporting, coordination, and applicable laws 
provisions of the Byrne JAG Statute.114 Section B argues that although the First 
Circuit reached the same conclusion as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, it correctly adopted different reasoning regarding the special conditions 
clause.115 
                                                                                                                           
 111 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 41. According to the interpretive doctrine of noscitur a sociis, 
the meaning of an ambiguous word or phrase “should be determined by the words immediately sur-
rounding it.” Noscitur a Sociis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 43. 
 112 See Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 42–43 (noting the shortcomings in the DOJ’s argument 
that a narrow interpretation of the special conditions clause would violate the canon against surplus-
age). The canon against surplusage instructs that every word of a legal provision must be given effect. 
Surplusage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 43. The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the same 
reasoning articulated by the DOJ regarding the 2006 amendment to the special conditions clause when 
it held that the DOJ did in fact have independent authority to impose special conditions on grants. See 
City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that Congress amends statute 
purposefully and that this amendment showed that it meant to give the AAG authority to specially 
condition grants). The First Circuit, in contrast, noted that this interpretive canon became a “double-
edged sword” in this case. Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 43. The DOJ’s reading of the special con-
ditions clause, it reasoned, would render provisions of other statutes meaningless, particularly those 
that specify the amount of Byrne JAG funding that can be withheld for specific reasons. Id. 
 113 See City of Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23, 33, 37, 40–42, 44 (1st Cir. 2020) (analyzing the 
text of the data reporting, coordination, and applicable laws provisions, as well as the special condi-
tions clause, and drawing on interpretive doctrines and the statutory structure to inform their mean-
ing); see also 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(4) (the data reporting provision); id. § 10153(a)(5)(C)–(D) (the 
coordination provision and the applicable laws provision); id. § 10102(a)(6) (the special conditions 
clause). 
 114 See infra notes 116–126 and accompanying text. 
 115 See infra notes 127–133 and accompanying text. 
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A. The First Circuit Correctly Rejected the Second Circuit’s Holding 
In Providence v. Barr, the First Circuit rightly rejected the Second Circuit’s 
analysis in favor of an approach that respected congressional intent.116 First, the 
court correctly applied the meaning of the Byrne JAG Statute’s data reporting 
and coordination provisions.117 The court was right to criticize the Second Cir-
cuit’s application that gave the DOJ authority to impose the notice and access 
conditions on any grant-funded program related to prosecution or custody.118 By 
covering nearly all law enforcement activities, this interpretation defied Con-
gress’s intent that the grant program provide grantees with flexibility to use 
funding toward programs that best fit their needs.119 Further, in considering the 
applicable laws provision, the First Circuit rightly noted that the Second Cir-
cuit’s reliance on a dictionary definition of “applicable” led to an extremely 
                                                                                                                           
 116 See Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 45 (striking down the challenged grant conditions as un-
lawful). But see New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that the 
challenged conditions were statutorily authorized and did not violate the Constitution). In Providence 
v. Barr, the First Circuit rightly noted that the structure and context of a particular statutory provision 
illuminate legislative intent. 954 F.3d at 31. See generally Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: 
The Heuristic Nature of Statutory Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 62–63 (2003) (explaining that where 
a statute’s plain language is ambiguous, courts commonly analyze legislative intent to decipher the 
meaning of the phrase). Although interpreting congressional intent is at best an estimate of what U.S. 
representatives mean to communicate when drafting legislation, textualists must make approximations 
of a statute’s “public meaning” as well. Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Sub-
stantive Canons, Stare Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administra-
tive State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791, 805 (2010). The court in Providence v. Barr kept congressional intent 
at the center of its analysis, noting that it served as its “lodestar” in statutory interpretation and repeat-
edly explaining how the language and structure of the statutes at issue reflected that intent. 954 F.3d at 
31, 34, 39, 42, 44. The First Circuit determined that the Byrne JAG Statute’s characterization of the 
grant program as a “formula grant” was clear evidence that Congress did not mean to allow for discre-
tionary imposition of sweeping conditions. Id. at 34. Further, the court rejected the DOJ’s broad read-
ing of the applicable laws provision because it concluded that Congress did not intend to require grant 
applicants to comply with “every law that mandates some form of cooperation with the federal gov-
ernment on criminal justice matters.” Id. at 39 (emphasis added). It reasoned that where Congress 
meant to require compliance with other statutes as a condition of grant funding, it made its intent 
explicit. Id. 
 117 Compare Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 35 (concluding that noncitizens’ release dates were not 
“programmatic” information within the meaning of the Byrne JAG Statute), with New York v. Dep’t of 
Just., 951 F.3d at 117 (determining that the data reporting provision is limited to “programmatic and 
financial” information, but reasoning that the noncitizen release information was ‘programmatic,’” at 
least for certain types of grant programs). 
 118 See New York v. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d at 117 (holding that the DOJ had authority to require 
grant recipients to share release information of noncitizens because this was “programmatic” infor-
mation, as referred to in the data reporting provision of the Byrne JAG Statute). The Second Circuit 
interpreted “programmatic” to refer to Byrne JAG programs related to prosecution, incarceration, or 
release, which it noted would naturally include some non-citizens. Id. 
 119 See Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 35 (noting that this interpretation would give the DOJ the 
ability to require Byrne JAG applicants to coordinate with them across a vast range of the applicants’ 
operations); see also New York v. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d at 93 (noting that Congress drafted the Byr-
ne JAG Statute to provide flexibility to use grant monies to meet recipients’ vast array of needs, re-
jecting a “‘one-size fits all’ solution”). 
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broad reading of the provision that failed to account for the narrower legislative 
intent evidenced by the inclusion of this limiting word.120 
Additionally, in discussing legislative intent, the First Circuit, in stark con-
trast to the Second Circuit, properly weighed the significance of the formula na-
ture of the grant.121 The First Circuit concluded that the statute’s specification of 
how to account for population and violent crime rates in determining grant 
amounts, as well as particular instances in which the DOJ may vary from this 
formula, demonstrated clear intent for the Byrne JAG Program to be a formula 
grant.122 The Second Circuit, in contrast, attempted to reason its way around this 
intent.123 It recharacterized the DOJ’s denial of all funds to jurisdictions that re-
fused to comply with the challenged conditions, an obvious variance from the 
grant’s formula, as merely a preliminary issue of applicant qualifications.124 In a 
convoluted argument, it determined that conditioning Byrne JAG Grants in this 
way did not upset the formula grant structure because these cities were not quali-
fied applicants to begin with.125 The First Circuit astutely criticized this ra-
tionale, explaining that the Byrne JAG Statute at no point expresses Congress’s 
intent to authorize the DOJ to change the statutorily enumerated grant qualifica-
tions on its own accord and in ways unrelated to the grant program.126 
                                                                                                                           
 120 Compare Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 37 (noting that Congress could have simply phrased 
the provision to require compliance with “all other Federal laws,” but it chose to limit this to “appli-
cable” federal laws), with New York v. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d at 106 (relying on the dictionary defi-
nition of “applicable,” meaning “capable of being applied: having relevance,” to construe any “appli-
cable Federal law” as that which “pertain[s] either to the State or locality seeking a Byrne grant or to 
the grant being sought”). The First Circuit rebuked the Second Circuit for its “blind allegiance to the 
dictionary definition of ‘applicable’” that it contended failed to answer the question of what would 
make a federal law “relevant” so as to come within the applicable laws provision. Providence v. Barr, 
954 F.3d at 37. 
 121 Compare Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 34 (explaining how the Byrne JAG Grant is allocat-
ed based on the statutory formula), with New York v. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d at 103 (providing little 
discussion of the formula nature of the grant and instead emphasizing the Attorney General’s authority 
in helping prescribe how application qualifications prescribed by Congress will be met). See generally 
supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing formula grants and the specific formula employed 
by the Byrne JAG Grant). 
 122 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 34 (commenting that Congress’s intent for the Byrne JAG 
Grant to be a formula grant was “nose-on-the-face plain”). The court referenced specific examples of 
how the Byrne JAG Statute allowed for deviations from the formula, such as setting aside up to 5% of 
grant monies for “extraordinary increases in crime” and retaining 10% from applicant states that do 
not comply with the federal sex offender registry requirement. Id. 
 123 See New York v. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d at 103 (acknowledging briefly the formula nature of 
Byrne JAG Grants but stating that applicants must first demonstrate their qualifications and emphasiz-
ing the Attorney General’s “considerable authority” in determining the requirements to qualify as an 
applicant). 
 124 Id. at 103–04. 
 125 See id. at 107 (stating that the Byrne JAG Grant’s formula nature did not warrant a narrow 
reading of the applicable federal laws provision because formula grant applicants must meet program 
requirements to be considered eligible for funding in the first place). 
 126 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 39. 
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B. The First Circuit Rightly Distinguished Its Analysis of the Special 
Conditions Clause from That of the Ninth Circuit 
Despite agreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate conclusion that the DOJ 
lacked authority to impose the challenged conditions, the First Circuit correctly 
interpreted the special conditions clause differently.127 The Ninth Circuit held 
that the DOJ had independent authority to impose special conditions on Byrne 
JAG Grants but determined that the conditions at issue were simply not “special 
conditions” nor “priority purposes” under the statute.128 In contrast, the First 
Circuit held that no such independent authority existed at all.129 
At face value, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, which highlighted the need to 
give meaning to Congress’s 2006 decision to add the special conditions clause to 
the statute outlining the AAG’s duties, appears persuasive.130 Yet, the First Cir-
cuit’s rationale is more persuasive still: it noted that its reading of the clause in 
no way deprives the amendment of meaning because the AAG can still impose 
such special conditions if and when vested with such power.131 The First Circuit 
also pointed out the faulty logic behind the Ninth Circuit’s application of the 
canon against surplusage in this instance.132 In attempting to ensure that the spe-
cial conditions clause was not deprived of meaning by reading the DOJ’s grant 
conditioning authority broadly, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation effectively gut-
ted other statutory provisions of their meaning.133 
                                                                                                                           
 127 Compare id. at 42, 45 (concluding that the DOJ impermissibly imposed the conditions absent 
congressional authority to do so, but rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the special condi-
tions clause), with City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931, 939, 944 (9th Cir. 2019) (rejecting the 
City of Los Angeles’s argument to find that the special conditions clause did provide the DOJ with 
independent authority to impose special conditions, but ultimately concluding that in this particular 
case, the challenged conditions were unlawful because they were neither “special conditions” nor 
“priority purposes” within the meaning of the statute). 
 128 Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d at 939–40. 
 129 Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 40–41. 
 130 See Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d at 939 (rejecting the city’s argument that the special condi-
tions clause did not grant the AAG any independent authority to condition grants). The court reasoned 
that the city’s interpretation would deprive all meaning from Congress’s 2006 amendment to the stat-
ute outlining the AAG’s duties and functions. Id. 
 131 See Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 43 (noting that “the canon against surplusage is not a 
straightjacket” and should not be used to eliminate all interpretations where language serves only an 
illustrative purpose). 
 132 See id. (noting the unlikelihood that Congress would have set specific percentages of grant 
funds that the DOJ could withhold from applicants who did not comply with certain requirements—
such as a 10% withholding for failure to document fatalities in custody—if the special conditions 
clause gave it sweeping authority to withhold all funding simply by creating a special condition); Los 
Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d at 939 (holding that Congress’s inclusion of the special conditions clause in 
its 2006 amendment to the Byrne JAG Statute demonstrated that it meant to give the DOJ power to 
specially condition all grants). 
 133 See Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d at 43 (noting that provisions that carefully enumerate the 
specific circumstances in which the DOJ may reduce grant awards would be rendered meaningless if 
the special conditions clause was read so as to give the AAG independent grant-conditioning authori-
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CONCLUSION 
In March 2020, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in City of Providence v. 
Barr held that the DOJ lacked statutory authority to impose immigration en-
forcement-related conditions on Providence and Central Falls’s Byrne JAG 
Grants. This decision respected congressional intent and correctly interpreted the 
plain language of the Byrne JAG Statute and the statute governing the AAG’s 
duties. The court rightly rejected the Second Circuit’s holding that would make 
Byrne JAG Grants almost entirely discretionary in defiance of the statutory lan-
guage and aims. It also rightly course-corrected from the Ninth Circuit’s inter-
pretation of the special conditions clause that would give the DOJ limited inde-
pendent authority to impose special conditions on grants. Courts facing similar 
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ty). But see Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d at 939 (rejecting the City of Los Angeles’s argument that 
the 2006 amendment to § 10102(a)(6) failed to give the DOJ any independent authority because such 
a reading would render the amendment meaningless). 
